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Abstract 
Business cycle patterns in common stock returns have been widely tested in the U.S. (e.g. 
Fama and French (1989), Korniotis and Kumar (2013)) and the UK (e.g. Priestley (1997), 
Velazquez and Smith (2013)). And despite the relevance of the topic, the literature seems to 
lack evidence from continental Europe. This study fills part of the gap through testing 
whether stock returns vary with business cycles in a predictable manner for a set of 
continental European countries. We collect a comprehensive set of data spanning from 
1999Q4 till 2015Q4 and covering Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany, then we 
regress residual returns from a market risk free rate of value-weighted country portfolios over 
lagged economic indicators that are likely to vary with the business cycle. The main findings 
of the study suggest that (i) country-level business cycle indicators are not robust predictors 
of stock returns and (ii) the Eurozone counterparts of these indicators incorporate more 
valuable information about future country-level stock returns. We present several economic 
justifications for our findings. First, stock market wealth accounts for a small percentage of 
household’s net worth in continental Europe which makes it harder for short-run country-
level economic fluctuations to propagate to the stock market. Second, the period covered by 
the study starts at the time of introducing the euro as a single currency and captures several 
economic crises; all of which are events that granted Eurozone indicators a significant 
predictive power of country stock returns because they contributed to: (i) financial and 
economic convergence of Eurozone economies (ii) increased comovements in Eurozone 
equity markets and (iii) higher regional equity bias to the detriment of home bias of European 
investors. Our findings have significant implications for investors using macroeconomic 
trading strategies to time the European equity markets. 
Key words: stock returns predictability, business cycles, Eurozone   
JEL Classification: G17, E30, E44 
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Resumo 
O impacto das tendências dos ciclos económicos nas rendibilidades das ações tem sido um 
assunto amplamente testado para os mercados dos EUA (e. g., Fama e French (1989), 
Korniotis e Kumar (2013)) e do Reino Unido (e.g., Priestley (1997), Velazquez e Smith 
(2013)). Apesar da importância do tema, existe pouca investigação em amostras da Europa 
continental. Este estudo preenche essa lacuna ao testar se os retornos das ações variam de 
acordo com os ciclos de negócios de um modo previsível para um conjunto de países da 
Europa continental. Recolhemos um conjunto abrangente de dados que vão desde o 4º. 
trimestre de 1999 até ao 4º. trimestre de 2015, considerando os mercados de ações de 
Portugal, Espanha, Itália, França e Alemanha. Depois, foi efectuada uma regressão dos 
retornos residuais em função de indicadores económicos desfasados que previsivelmente 
devem variar com os ciclos económicos. Os principais resultados do estudo indicam que (i) 
os indicadores dos ciclos económicos nacionais não são úteis para fazer previsões sobre 
rendibilidades e que (ii) os indicadores homólogos da Zona Euro captam informações mais 
relevantes sobre retornos futuros ao nível do país. Apresentamos várias justificações 
económicas para estes resultados. Em primeiro lugar, a riqueza investida no mercado de 
ações é apenas uma pequena percentagem do valor líquido da riqueza das famílias da Europa 
continental, o que torna mais difícil que flutuações económicas de curto prazo ao nível do 
país se possam propagar no mercado de ações. Em segundo lugar, o período em que este 
estudo incide começa no momento da introdução do euro como moeda única e portanto 
abrange várias crises económicas nacionais; todos estes eventos levaram a que os indicadores 
da zona euro tivessem um poder de previsão mais significativo de retornos de ações ao nível 
de país, pois eles contribuíram: (i) para a convergência económica e financeira das economias 
da zona do euro, (ii) para o aumento de movimentos correlacionados nos mercados de ações 
da Zona Euro e (iii) para um maior enviesamento regional no investimento em ações em 
detrimento do tradicional enviesamento nacionais dos investidores europeus. Os nossos 
resultados têm implicações significativas para os investidores que usam estratégias de 
transação baseadas em indicadores macroeconómicos nos mercados de ações europeus. 
Palavras-chave: previsibilidade dos retornos de ações, ciclos de negócios, Zona Euro 
Classificação JEL: G17, E30, E44 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a longstanding interest in studying the interactions between business cycles and 
equity returns, and whether those interactions generate predictable return patterns that can be 
potentially exploited. The relevant literature widely covers the U.S. (e.g. Fama and French 
(1989), Korniotis and Kumar (2013)) and the UK (e.g. Priestley (1997), Velazquez and Smith 
(2013)) but misses continental Europe; we intend to fill part of this gap in the literature.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining whether stock returns vary 
with business cycles in a predictable manner for a set of continental European economies, 
namely Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. We rely on the paper by Korniotis and 
Kumar (2013) “State-Level Business Cycles and Local Return Predictability” as our 
benchmark study; the authors tested for state portfolio return predictability in the U.S. using 
state and aggregate U.S. level business cycle economic indicators. Conversely, we consider 
the Eurozone as the aggregate economy and we test for country-level return predictability 
using country and Eurozone business cycle variables. 
First, we construct value weighted country portfolios including stocks of all companies 
headquartered in the country; we exclude companies with market capitalizations lower than 
45000 USD because their return and market capitalization data is highly inconsistent. We use 
the residual return from a market risk free rate of the value-weighted portfolios as the 
dependent variable to ensure that our return series do not reflect variations in the European 
benchmark risk free rate. Our sample spans from 1999Q4 till 2015Q4 because some of the 
economic indicators are not available at a higher frequency for a longer time interval. The 
main explanatory variables are economic indicators that are likely to vary with the business 
cycle. Namely (i) growth rate of labor income defined as the log difference of labor income 
in the current quarter and the same quarter in the previous year, (ii) relative unemployment 
rate calculated as the ratio of the current level of unemployment to the moving average of 
unemployment rate in the past 16 quarters and (iii) yearly growth in housing prices defined 
as the log difference between housing prices index value in the current quarter and the same 
quarter in the previous year. We include the same indicators on a country and Eurozone level 
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because it allows us to test whether country stock returns capture trends in the aggregate 
Eurozone economy. In addition, we use the dividend yield of country portfolios as a control 
variable plus two Eurozone spreads; term spread calculated as the return difference between 
AAA-Eurozone 10-year government bond and AAA-Eurozone 1-year government bond and 
borrowing spread defined as the difference between Eurozone average corporate borrowing 
rate and Eurozone average government long-term bond yields. 
The two main conclusions we draw from our return predictability regressions are (i) country 
level business cycle indicators are not robust predictors of country stock returns in Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, France and Germany, and (ii) the Eurozone counterparts of these indicators 
incorporate more valuable information about future country-level stock returns in the 
aforementioned countries. The results of our regressions are exactly the opposite of those 
obtained by Korniotis and Kumar (2013); the authors found that two of the three main state-
level predictors were significant whereas all of their U.S. counterparts were not.  
We present two main economic justifications for this contradiction. First, stock market 
wealth accounts for a lower percentage of household’s net worth in continental European 
economies than in the U.S. which makes it harder for temporary country-level fluctuations 
in the business cycle to propagate to the stock market through household demand shocks. 
Second, the period covered by our study was marked by several economic developments that 
granted EU indicators more significant predictive power than their country-level 
counterparts. In particular, (i) the macroeconomic and financial convergence associated with 
introducing the euro as a single currency on the first of January 1999, (ii) the increase in 
regional equity bias to the detriment of home bias associated with the same event and (iii) 
the increased financial contagion phenomenon induced by the dotcom bubble, global 
financial crisis and to a lesser extent the European debt crisis.  
The rest of the study proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the literature, section 3 provides 
a comprehensive description of the data and methodology, section 4 shows the estimation 
output and presents the analysis, section 5 summarizes and concludes with suggestions for 
future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Do stock returns vary in a predictable manner? This question has been of longstanding 
interest to both academics and practitioners, and the evidence so far has been mixed. In the 
literature review, we start by relating predictability of asset returns to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, then we discuss various approaches to the predictability debate. The topics we 
cover, in the order they appear in the review, are (i) business cycle patterns in common stock 
returns (ii) asset pricing models and return predictability (iii) the predictive power of 
monetary policy variables (iv) inflation and asset returns (v) the predictive power of popular 
fundamental ratios (vi) the forecasting ability of other ratios (vii) other approaches to the 
predictability debate (viii) evidence against the predictability literature and (ix) defense of 
predictability. Each paragraph signals a new topic in the predictability literature and the final 
paragraphs states concluding remarks, we respect the chronological order of studies within 
each paragraph in most of the cases. 
Much of the more recent predictability literature was motivated by the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis; it was claimed that evidence on return predictability would be inconsistent with 
the efficiency paradigm. However, nowadays, predictability of time varying-expected returns 
and market efficiency can coexist, and the attention is more directed towards how much 
predictability is compatible with efficient markets (Lanne, 2002).  Both behaviorists and 
efficiency proponents agree that expected returns are predictable; but they disagree whether 
this predictability is caused by rational or irrational variations in risk. This was illustrated by 
Eugene Fama in his Nobel Prize lecture: 
“Efficient market types (like me) judge that predictable variation in expected returns on 
stocks and bonds is rational, the result of variation in risk or willingness to bear risk. In 
contrast, behaviorists argue that much of the predictability is due to irrational swings of 
prices away from fundamental values.” (Fama, 2013, p. 9) 
Business cycle patterns in common stock returns have been widely tested. Fama and French 
(1989) conjectured that expected returns are higher (lower) when economic conditions are 
weak (strong). They used the default spread (yield difference between the market portfolio 
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of corporate bonds and Aaa bonds) and the dividend yield ratio to track long term business 
conditions, and the term spread (difference between Aaa yield and 1-month T-bill rate) to 
track the shorter-term business cycles. The three variables were able to predict stock and 
bond returns suggesting that variations in expected returns are related to long-and-short-term 
variations in the business cycle. Priestley (1997) tested for cyclicality in UK stock returns 
and found that return seasonality is caused by the high risk associated with holding stocks in 
some periods of the year, namely January and December, because those periods are important 
in the yearly business cycle and can significantly indicate current and following levels of 
economic activity. The author also found evidence for April effect and suggested that it might 
be due to the timing of the UK tax year end and UK annual Government Budget, both of 
which are events that may have implications on future levels of economic activity. Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002) used all NYSE-AMEX stocks to show that payoffs to momentum 
strategies can be explained by a parsimonious set of lagged macroeconomic indicators that 
vary with the business cycle. Velazquez and Smith (2013) examined business cycles and 
equity returns using a long period of UK data and confirmed the counter-cyclicality of equity 
returns; returns tend to be higher following recession quarters rather than expansion ones. 
In addition to the direct business cycle analysis, many equilibrium and asset pricing models 
aimed to predict and explain the pro-cyclical variation in stock returns. Balvers et al. (1990) 
developed an equilibrium model relating asset returns to fluctuations in output; they argued 
that output fluctuations lead investors to smooth consumption by adjusting their required rate 
of return on financial assets. The authors adopted assumptions from real business cycle 
models to show that output is auto-correlated, then suggested that output forecasts can predict 
stock returns in the U.S., UK, Canada and Japan. Cochrane (1991) developed a production-
based asset pricing model that was able to explain two links between returns and the business 
cycle: (i) several variables forecast stock returns and (ii) many of those variables, and stock 
returns, forecast economic activity measures. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) constructed a 
consumption based model that uses mean reversion in returns and the dividend-price ratio to 
generate long horizon forecasts of excess stock returns. Their model was able to capture the 
main business cycle swings in stock prices over the past hundred years when fed with actual 
consumption data. Similarly, Yogo (2006) developed a consumption-based model and 
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concluded that returns on value and small stocks show higher pro-cyclicality than those on 
growth and big stocks, equity premium is highly countercyclical and returns tend to be 
unexpectedly high (low) during booms (recessions). 
A significant part of the literature studied the predictive role of monetary policy. Patelis 
(1997) proposed a new set of monetary policy variables that can significantly predict stock 
returns, namely the federal funds rate, interest rate spreads, the quantity of non-borrowed 
reserves and the portion of non-borrowed reserve growth orthogonal to total reserve growth. 
The author used nested regressions to show that the predictive power of monetary variables 
is distinct from that of popular financial variables. Thorbecke (1997) utilized a similar set of 
monetary indicators and suggested that expansionary monetary policy increases ex-post stock 
returns. The aforementioned findings, among others, were subject to a lot of scrutiny. 
Durham (2003) argued that the relationship between monetary policy and stock returns is 
less vigorous than indicated by previous studies. Through analyzing a comprehensive set of 
data for 16 countries, Durham (2003) showed that the statistical significance vanishes when 
using excess return as the dependent variable, dividing the sample period into smaller sub-
periods, or utilizing panel regressions. 
In regards to inflation; Nelson (1976), Bodie (1976), Jaffe and Mandelker (1976) as well as 
Fama and Schwert (1977) documented a negative relationship between stock returns and both 
expected and unexpected components of inflation (Fama, 1981). This contradicts Fisher’s 
hypothesis that on average investors will be fully rewarded for any deterioration in 
purchasing power (Fisher, 1930). Fama (1981) investigated those findings and found that 
much of the negative evidence is due to proxy effects. He conjectured that forecasts of more 
relevant real variables determine stock returns, and the negative relation between return and 
inflation is caused by negative inflation-real activity relations.  
In addition to the work targeting empirical linkages between the macro-economy and stock 
returns, the predictive power of fundamental variables has been widely tested. Campbell and 
Shiller (1988) showed that the ratio of a long moving average of real earnings to the current 
stock price can powerfully predict long term stock returns. Fama and French (1988) found 
that the dividend yield explains less than 5% of variances of monthly or quarterly returns but 
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can explain more than 25% of return variances when considering two to four year horizons. 
Evidence of the forecasting and explanatory abilities of fundamental variables was also 
documented outside of the U.S.; Chan et al. (1991) found a significant relationship between 
expected returns in Japan and earnings yield, cash flow yield, book to market ratio and size. 
Similarly, Mukherji et al. (1997) found a positive relationship between annual stock returns 
in Korea during the 1982-1993 period and book to market, sales to price and dividends to 
earnings ratios. 
The forecasting ability of ratios such as the consumption-aggregate wealth ratio (cay) and 
housing collateral ratio (hy) was also tested. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) argued that the cay 
residual demonstrates better forecasting abilities than the dividend yield and dividend payout 
ratios on both the short and intermediate terms. Sousa (2010) used UK and U.S. data to show 
that disintegrating the wealth from cay into housing and financial wealth improves forecasts 
of stock returns. In contrast, Hamburg et al. (2005) tested cay’s predictive power using 
German data and found that it predicts income changes rather than stock market fluctuations. 
On a different note, Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) used the hy ratio defined as the log 
ratio of housing equity to labor income to show that changes in house prices can explain 
fluctuations in asset returns. They reasoned that a decline in house prices decreases the 
collateral value of houses which adversely affects risk sharing, this leads to an increase in the 
conditional market price of risk caused by an increase in household’s exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk. Thus, a decrease in hy predicts higher market returns. 
Several other perspectives were used to approach the predictability debate. Huang and Stoll 
(1994) studied the predictive power of market microstructure variables and found that 
expected transaction return is negatively related to the deviation between transaction prices 
and quote midpoint, while expected quote return is positively related to the same variable.  
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004) found evidence suggesting that stock market returns are 
forecastable by returns on glamour stocks in the prior 3-year period; they showed that the 
predictive power of glamour stock returns remains robust after introducing variables such as 
the dividend yield, cay, default and term premiums as control variables. In addition, Doukas 
et al. (2006) documented a positive relationship between divergence of investors’ opinions 
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about the value of a stock and its future return, which contradicts the overvaluation 
hypothesis proposed by Miller (1977).  
Volatility, sentiments and demographics were also used to explain and forecast returns. 
French et al. (1987) documented a positive relationship between the expected risk premium 
on common stocks and the predictable volatility of stock returns. Neal and Whealtley (1998) 
suggested that sentiment variables such as net redemptions and fund discounts are able to 
predict the size premium. Edmans et al. (2007) used international soccer results as a primary 
mood variable and found that losses in the elimination stage of the World Cup result in -49 
bp abnormal stock return in the next day. On a different note, Goyal (2004) analyzed U.S. 
data to show that an increase in the middle-age population leads to higher short-run returns 
and lower long-run ones, whereas an increase in the old-age population leads to parallel but 
opposite effects. 
Evidence of return predictability was subject to a lot of scrutiny. Stambaugh (1986) as well 
as Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) argued that using pre-determined variables as explanatory 
factors will lead to over-rejecting the non-predictability hypothesis. Nelson and Kim (1993) 
as well as Lanne (2002) highlighted problems that often lead to spurious results when 
employing standard methods to test for return predictability. First, all typical predictive 
variables are substantially persistent and their univariate representation has a considerable 
autoregressive root. Second, overlapping data in long-horizon regressions causes serial 
correlations in the error term. Lanne (2002) showed that the standard t-test over-rejects and 
suggested a stationary test to argue that no persistent variable, including the dividend yield, 
can predict U.S. stock returns in the 1928-1996 period. Campbell and Yogo (2006) confirmed 
persistence as a serious issue for both dividend yield and smoothed earnings-price; they 
designed a pre-test to show that t-test inferences are invalid for both ratios. The authors found 
evidence for predictability using interest rate variables that survived their pre-test, and 
concluded that predictability is harder to find compared to what suggested by previous 
studies.  
Likewise, non-standard econometric methods demonstrated evidence against the predictive 
power of several popular forecasting ratios. Goetzmann and Jorion (1993) employed the 
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bootstrap methodology and found that dividend yields cannot predict U.S. stock returns 
between the years 1927 and 1990. Wolf (2000) used subsampling, which is superior to both 
VAR and bootstrap, and found no evidence in favor of predictability of U.S. stock returns by 
the dividend yield. On a similar note, Cooper et al. (2005) used a recursive out of sample 
method to test whether real time investors could have forecasted returns over the 1974-1997 
period using size, book to market and momentum effects. They found that the market was 
hard to beat and showed a remarkable difference between ex-post and ex-ante predictability, 
which raises doubts about plenty of the predictability evidence. Moreover, Hjalmarsson 
(2010) tested for predictability in 24 developed and 16 emerging economies using an 
alternative robust estimator to the standard fixed effects model. He found no evidence 
supporting the dividend yield and earning price ratios as return predictors; however, both 
term spread and short interest rate showed robust forecasting abilities in developed markets. 
Evidence against the predictability literature sparked several comeback attempts by the 
latter’s proponents. Boudoukh et al. (2007) showed that mismeasurement is more responsible 
for demising the dividend yield as a return predictor than factors such as spurious correlations 
and learning. The legislation of the rule 10b-18 in 1982 sparked a surge in repurchase activity, 
which affected the way firms distribute earnings to shareholders. Thus, the total payout ratio 
(dividends plus repurchases) is a better return predictor than the dividend yield. The study 
showed that the dividend yield exhibits significant dynamic changes around the time of the 
aforementioned SEC legislation, and its predictive power declines subsequently when post 
1984 data are incorporated in the analysis. On the contrary, payout yields exhibit no 
significant changes, and their forecasting ability stays robust across different time periods. 
Cochrane (2008) argued that if returns are not predictable, then dividend growth must be 
predictable to generate the observed fluctuation in the dividend yield ratio. However, he 
found no evidence that higher price-dividend ratios are correlated with higher dividend 
growth afterwards. Lettau and Nieuwerburgh (2008) suggested a procedure to extract the 
stationary component of popular forecasting price ratios. The adjusted ratios were significant 
and stable in predicting future returns in sample and functioned better than the unadjusted 
ones out of sample. Among the latest evidence presented in favor of return predictability is 
our benchmark paper by Korniotis and Kumar (2013). The authors conjectured that changes 
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in local macroeconomic conditions can induce shifts in risk aversion and risk sharing levels, 
which, in presence of high local ownership, produces predictable patterns in stock returns 
through negative demand shocks by local investors. The predictability evidence presented in 
the paper is robust to problems of persistence and endogeneity, and is preserved when 
employing bootstrap or recursive methods. 
The scientific knowledge in the predictability field has progressed from Fama and French 
(1988): “There is much evidence that stock returns are predictable.” To authors using titles 
as “Spurious Regressions in Financial Economics” (Ferson et al. 2003) and “Testing the 
Predictability of Stock Returns” (Lanne, 2002); which made it necessary for the literature to 
attempt “Reconciling the Return Predictability Evidence” (Lettau and Nieuwerburgh, 2008). 
The predictability debate is far from over. Our study provides evidence from Europe; we use 
the most comprehensive set of data covering five major economies in Continental Europe to 
analyze the interactions between business cycle variables and stock returns. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
This chapter presents a comprehensive description of the data collection process and choice 
of variables. First we justify our choice of countries included in the study, then we show how 
we construct country portfolios and derive the residual return series. After that we reason our 
choice of macroeconomic indicators and finally we present the table of descriptive statistics 
and describe the methodological aspects of the study. 
3.1. Choice of Countries 
 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) conjectured that short-term economic fluctuations can influence 
stock returns through demand shocks by local investors. Hence, investigating the interactions 
between country-level business cycles and stock returns becomes more reasonable when 
local stocks are owned by investors residing in the same country. Therefore, our sample of 
European countries takes into consideration the levels of local equity ownership as well as 
the availability of macroeconomic data on a quarterly frequency for a sufficient time span. 
Table 1 shows equity and bond home bias levels for EU-14 countries plus the UK and U.S. 
Table 1: Equity and bond home bias levels, 1997-2012 
 
Source. Schoenmaker and Soeter (2014). 
Note. Table 1 presents a country breakdown of equity and bond home bias levels for all EU-14 countries as well 
as the U.S. and UK. Home bias levels vary from zero to one and assume a value of zero when investors show 
no preference for local equity.  
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All the listed countries maintain extremely high levels of home bias in the 1997-2012 period. 
However, this is not enough to prove high local ownership because home bias measures the 
extent to which a country over-invests in its own equity, or in other words, the extent to which 
a country invests in its own equity beyond the optimal investment level from a diversification 
point of view (Schoenmaker and Soeter, 2014). Therefore, local ownership can be low 
despite high home bias levels; this can be the case in any country where local investors over-
invest in local equity but the combined dollar value of their investments in local stocks is low 
relative to that of foreign investors. In this case home bias is high because local investors do 
not benefit from cross-country diversification, but local ownership is low because the portion 
of local market capitalization owned by local investors is low compared to that owned by 
foreign investors. 
We followed the sources used by the authors and tried to calculate the ratio of foreign to total 
portfolio investment assets (equity and investment fund shares) for European countries using 
the IMF Consolidated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) data. However, for many countries 
the ratio was greater than 1 and the data was not entirely consistent. Balta and Delgado (2009) 
mentioned that CPIS data are inaccurate, underreported and fail to track the end investors. 
Therefore, we had to find an alternative source. A report titled “Who Owns the European 
Economy? Evolution of The Ownership of EU-Listed Companies Between 1970 and 2012” 
by Davidoff et al. (2013) used rigorous data sets to construct Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Share of foreign investors in total market capitalization, 2011 
 
Source. Davidoff et al. (2013). 
Note. Figure 1 shows the percentage of domestic market capitalization owned by foreign investor for a set of 
European countries. 
A foreign investor, as identified by the report, is an equity owner who does not reside in the 
same country in which the company is based. Thus, by subtracting the values in the graph 
from 100% we obtain the levels of local equity ownership.  
Considering the location of our Master’s program; we are curious conduct our study in 
Portugal and the neighboring economies.  Therefore, we perform the analysis on Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, France and Germany; all of which are countries with levels of local equity 
ownership greater than 50%. Since the report showed an increasing trend in the share of 
foreign investors starting in the beginning of the 1980s except for a slight decrease during the 
financial crisis; we can conjecture that levels of local equity ownership were generally higher 
before 2011. Our study covers the interval 1999Q4-2015Q4, therefore, local equity 
ownership is evidently very high for the vast majority of the studied period. 
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3.2. Constructing Country Portfolios 
 
We investigate the relation between country-level macroeconomic indicators and stock 
returns by using the return series of value-weighted country portfolios. We use quarterly data 
for the period 1999Q4-2015Q4 because some of our macroeconomic indicators are not 
available on a monthly basis and for a longer time span. 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) followed the convention in the local bias literature (e.g., 
Pirinsky and Wang (2006), Hong et al. (2008)) to proxy for firm location using corporate 
headquarters location. We follow the same convention in our study.  
Data for corporate headquarters location are obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon using 
the “Equity Screener” function. We screen all active public companies with a minimum 
market capitalization of 45000 USD by filtering for the country of headquarters. This results 
in 57 companies headquartered in Portugal, 220 in Spain, 323 in Italy, 1128 in France and 
994 in Germany. We use the 45000 USD market capitalization criterion because it filters out 
much of the inconsistent return and market capitalization data while excluding only a 
negligible number of the consistent ones. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon’s function “Portfolios and Lists” allows creating value weighted 
portfolios, however the function provides only two years of quarterly historical return data 
which is not enough to conduct our study. Therefore, we had to construct the portfolios 
manually using historical return and market capitalization data for all retrieved stocks. 
We use the filtered results from the screener function to obtain quarterly returns1 and market 
capitalization data for all of the companies. Considering the size of the portfolios and the 
large amount of data, some of the retrieved values showed inconsistencies and suffered errors 
that could be avoided through retrieving data for each individual company on its own (this 
was not the case for the filtered out small cap stocks because their data remained inconsistent 
even when we tried to retrieve them individually). Therefore, in order to avoid any error that 
                                                          
1 Quarterly return, as defined by Thomson Reuters, incorporate price changes and any relevant dividends                         
paid within the quarter. 
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might bias our results, we went over the data and re-retrieved inconsistent values for each 
company individually. Data for some of the stocks were still inconsistent even when retrieved 
alone; we exclude these stocks from our analysis and we end up with portfolios of: 50 
companies in Portugal, 189 in Spain, 309 in Italy, 925 in France and 873 in Germany2.  
The final portfolios represent more than 96% of the total market capitalization of all filtered 
companies in each of the aforementioned countries. Therefore, we conjecture that the return 
series we use in this study are representative of the country-level return series. 
Our portfolios are value weighted and adjusted to changes in market capitalizations on a 
quarterly basis. Thus, we construct our return series using lagged values of the relative market 
capitalization following equation (3.2.1): 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = ∑
𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝑌𝑐,𝑡 
 
(3.2.1) 
where Yi,t is the portfolio return of country i at quarter t. On the right side of the equation, the 
numerator is the market capitalization at quarter t-1 of company c headquartered in country 
i, the denominator is the sum at quarter t-1of market capitalizations of all companies 
headquartered in country i. Therefore, the fraction gives the relative weight of company c 
stocks in the portfolio, invested at quarter t-1. Thus, multiplying the fraction by the return of 
the stock at quarter t gives the return earned by the portfolio from that specific stock. 
Performing the same procedure for all stocks in the portfolio then adding the returns will 
result in the country portfolio return series. 
To ensure that our return series capture the country-specific component of return and do not 
reflect variations in the European benchmark risk free rate, we estimate the residual from a 
market risk free rate model in which the risk free rate of return is the only dependent variable. 
First, we correct the nominal returns of the five portfolios for the inflation level in each 
country. We retrieve quarterly inflation rates for the five countries from the IFO Institute 
World Economic Survey data available via DataStream, then we divide quarterly returns by 
                                                          
2 Appendix A shows tables with identifiers of all excluded stocks in addition to detailed calculations on the 
portfolios’ representativeness of country-level market capitalization. 
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1+inflation rate to obtain real returns. We use the redemption yield (yield to maturity) of 3-
month German T-bills to proxy for the risk free rate of return. Annualized data of the 
redemption yield are retrieved from an index by Thomson Reuters also available on 
DataStream, we calculate the quarterly yields as follows: 
 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =  [(1 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑)^ (
1
4
)] − 1 
 
(3.2.2) 
3.3. Economic Indicators 
 
In this section we justify our choice of economic indicators. Whenever possible, we use the 
same indicators as Korniotis and Kumar (2013), however, due to fundamental differences in 
the geographical coverage of the two studies, our set of utilized indicators is not an exact 
copy of the benchmark study. Nevertheless, the economic intuition is the same. 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) tested for business cycle swings of stock returns on a state level 
in the U.S. They constructed state-level portfolios and considered each state a separate 
economy with its own economic indicators. In addition, the authors used U.S. economic 
indicators to ensure that state portfolios do not reflect trends in the aggregate U.S. economy. 
Following the same intuition, we utilize country-level economic indicators as well as 
Eurozone indicators to test if country-level returns reflect Eurozone trends. 
We consider three main country-level return predictors that are likely to move with the 
business cycle: 
i. Growth rate of country level labor income, this measure is defined as the log difference 
between country-level labor income in a given quarter and country-level labor income in 
the same quarter of the previous year. Based on Jagannathan and Wang (1996) as well as 
Campbell (1996); Korniotis and Kumar (2013) use this measure to proxy for return to 
human capital. 
We obtain data on wages and salaries from Eurostat via DataStream, this indicator as well 
as the rest of the economic indicators we use are not seasonally adjusted. 
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ii. Relative unemployment rate defined as the ratio of the current level of unemployment to 
the average unemployment rate in the prior 16 quarters. Korniotis and Kumar (2013) used 
this measure as a recession indicator for the state economy, we use it as a recession 
indicator on a country level. The average unemployment rate in the prior 16 quarters 
proxies the natural rate of unemployment, (un)favorable deviations of the current levels 
of unemployment from the natural rate signal (bad)good news for the economy. 
We obtain quarterly unadjusted unemployment rates from DataStream. For Portugal, 
Spain, Italy and Germany the data are sourced from National Institutes for Statistics. 
Whereas for France, we use the data provided by OECD Main Economic Indicators 
because all unemployment rates provided by INSEE (the French National Institute for 
Statistics and Economic Studies) are seasonally adjusted. 
iii. Our third economic indicator captures house-price developments; we use the house price 
indices provided by Oxford Economics and available on DataStream to calculate the 
yearly log difference in house prices within each of the studied countries. This measure 
is defined as the log difference between the index value in a given quarter and its value 
in the same quarter of the previous year. For Portugal, Italy France and Germany the price 
indices provide complete historical data for the full time span of our study, whereas for 
Spain, the index value from 2014Q2 onwards is based on forecasts by Oxford Economics.  
According to Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005), a decrease in house prices decreases 
the collateral value of houses which adversely affects risk sharing abilities. This increases 
investors’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk and raises the conditional market price of risk. 
Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) constructed a housing collateral ratio (hy), then 
showed that a lower U.S. hy forecasts higher market returns. Korniotis and Kumar (2013) 
used hy to proxy for investors’ ability to borrow against housing collateral and to 
effectively smooth consumption against future income shocks. We use the yearly log 
difference in a house price index to capture variations in the housing collateral ratio and 
to proxy for changes in the collateral value of houses. 
In addition to the three main predictors, we include the dividend yields of country portfolios 
as control variables. We use the ISIN codes of our stocks to retrieve quarterly dividend yield 
data from DataStream, then we compute the quarterly value-weighted dividend yields for our 
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country portfolios by replacing Y with DY (dividend yield) in equation (3.2.1).  Our quarterly 
dividend yield series is defined as the log of 1+DY of country portfolios. DataStream yields 
exclude special or once-off dividends and are computed based on the anticipated annual 
dividend per share as a percentage of the current share price. 
To ensure that state predictors do not solely capture the impact of the aggregate U.S. 
economic shocks, Korniotis and Kumar (2013) added several U.S. level macroeconomic 
indicators to their regression specification. The authors used the same state-level measures 
using U.S. data in addition to the U.S. cay (consumption-wealth) ratio and three return 
spreads (paper-bill, term and default spreads). 
Our study considers the Eurozone as the aggregate economy, therefore we incorporate 
Eurozone business cycle indicators in the analysis to test whether country-level stock returns 
are predictable by variations in the aggregate Eurozone business cycle. Accordingly, we use 
the same three main country-level indicators on a Eurozone level in addition to the following 
return spreads: 
i- Term spread: return difference between AAA-Eurozone 10-year government bond 
and AAA-Eurozone 1-year government bond. Data is obtained directly from Eurostat. 
ii- Corporate borrowing spread: difference between Eurozone average corporate 
borrowing rate and Eurozone average government long-term bond yields. The 
average corporate borrowing rate data are provided by Oxford Economics, whereas 
the Eurozone average government long-term bond yield data are provided by 
Eurostat; both series are retrieved via DataStream. 
We obtain Eurozone and country-level data from the same sources. Eurozone unemployment 
rates are retrieved from OECD Main Economic Indicators via DataStream and the Eurozone 
house price index by Oxford Economics provides complete historical data for the whole 
timespan of our study. 
All of the economic indicators are not seasonally adjusted and all our return predictors are 
corrected for the respective quarterly inflation rate. 
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3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables we use in the analysis. The 
table is generated via EViews and reproduced to fit in the document. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Symbol Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Obs. 
Residual Return RR 1.23E-11 0.278764 44.83195 -32.3345 10.31554 325 
Labor Income Growth INC 0.011788 0.013579 0.040094 -0.04707 0.013322 345 
Rel. Unemployment RU 0.994476 0.966133 1.826756 0.58887 0.212342 345 
Housing Prices Growth YHG 0.01221 0.009705 0.070376 -0.04387 0.024684 345 
log (1+ div yield) DIV 0.013464 0.012693 0.034834 0.004541 0.005211 340 
EU Labor Income Growth INCEU 0.013132 0.012488 0.026263 -0.00052 0.007053 345 
EU Rel. Unemployment  RUEU 0.984222 0.976891 1.268463 0.792482 0.123872 345 
EU Housing Prices Growth  YHGEU 0.012417 0.016964 0.030884 -0.01895 0.014088 345 
Term Spread TERM 1.464279 1.554572 2.986248 0.126582 0.770277 340 
Borrowing Spread BORROW 0.308978 0.252797 1.658723 -0.71705 0.525301 340 
Note. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for country portfolio returns and return predictors. The sample 
spans from 1999Q4 till 2015Q4. The return series we use is the residual return from a market risk free rate of a 
value weighted portfolio that includes all companies headquartered in the country, we exclude companies with 
market capitalization less than 45000 USD The benchmark risk free rate in the analysis is the yield to maturity 
of 3-month German T-bills obtained from DataStream. The returns as well as the return predictors are corrected 
for the relevant inflation rate obtained from the IFO Institute World Economic Survey via DataStream. The 
main return predictors are (i) labor income growth (log difference of labor income in current quarter and the 
same quarter in the previous year) obtained from Eurostat via DataStream, (ii) relative unemployment rate (ratio 
of current unemployment rate to moving average of unemployment in the past 16 quarters) obtained from 
National Institutes of Statistics and OECD Main Economic Indicators via DataStream, and (iii) growth in house 
prices (log difference of house price index in current quarter and the same quarter in the previous year) obtained 
from Oxford Economic also via DataStream. The main return predictors are not seasonally adjusted and are 
employed on both country and Eurozone levels. In addition, we use log (1+dividend yield) of country portfolios 
as a control variable as well as two Eurozone spreads; term spread (return difference between AAA-Eurozone 
10-year government bond and AAA-Eurozone 1-year government bond) from Eurostat and borrowing spread 
(difference between Eurozone average corporate borrowing rate and Eurozone average government long-term 
bond yields) from Oxford Economic and Eurostat via DataStream. The residual return from a market risk free 
rate as well as both the term and borrowing spreads show high standard deviations because our sample covers 
periods of turmoil and crises. The values of Eurozone measures are smoother and more clustered around their 
means than the analogous country-level measures, this is reflected in a relatively lower standard deviation. 
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3.5. Methodology 
 
Following the theoretical motivation of Korniotis and Kumar (2013), we consider a 
representative investor who owns a significant proportion of all public companies 
headquartered in her country of residence. Given that, the levels of risk aversion of the 
representative investor as well as her attempts to smooth consumption can influence stock 
returns. During business cycle recessions signaled by unemployment news or labor income 
shocks, the representative investor becomes more risk averse, thus she reduces her exposure 
to risky assets or requires a higher premium to invest in local stocks which depresses prices 
and generates predictable patterns in stock returns. Similarly, when the representative 
investor’s borrowing capacity against housing collateral deteriorates due to a decrease in 
house prices, her ability to share risk becomes higher which increases her exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk and increases the market price of risk. In this case stocks must offer higher 
future returns to remain attractive. As such, short-term economic fluctuations induced by the 
business cycle should be able to generate predictable patterns in stock returns. 
We test whether stock returns vary with the business cycle in a predictable manner in 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. We use the residual return from a market risk 
free rate as the dependent variable to ensure that our return series do not reflect variations in 
the European benchmark risk free rate. Our main explanatory variables are economic 
indicators that are likely to vary with the business cycle, namely labor income growth, 
relative unemployment rate and growth in a house price index. We include the same 
indicators on a country and Eurozone levels because it allows us to test whether country stock 
returns capture trends in the aggregate Eurozone business cycle. In addition to the three main 
predictors, we include the dividend yield of country portfolios as a control variable plus two 
Eurozone spreads: term spread and corporate borrowing spread. Therefore, the basic 
empirical model looks as follows: 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝐵1𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐵2𝑟𝑢𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐵3𝑦ℎ𝑔𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐵4𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐵5𝑖𝑛𝑐𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2 + 𝐵6𝑟𝑢𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2 + 𝐵7𝑦ℎ𝑔𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2
+ 𝐵8𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑈,𝑡−1 + 𝐵9𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑈,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … ,5,
𝑡 = 1, … ,65 
 
 
(3.5.1) 
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where i refers to the country, t to the quarterly time period and EU to the Eurozone. 𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is 
the residual return from a market risk free rate of country i at quarter t. On the right hand side 
of the equation, c is the constant term. inc, ru and yhg are the macroeconomic indicators 
representing income growth, relative unemployment rate and yearly growth in a house price 
index respectively. div refers to log (1+dividend yield) of country portfolios, term and borrow 
refer to the term spread and borrowing spread respectively and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. We use 
div, term and borrow with a lag of one quarter, whereas the macroeconomic indicators are 
employed from quarter t-2 because they are usually reported with a lag of two quarters. 
Our sample covers the 1999Q4-2015Q4 interval, a major event that took place during that 
period and might have caused a structural change to the model was the financial crisis. 
Therefore, in order to have deeper insights on the behavior of the model in that specific period 
and to test for the significance of the change brought by the crisis, we introduced a dummy 
variable denoted by crisis. We consider the period of the financial crisis as the duration 
between two business cycle peaks identified by the Centre for Economic Policy Research3 
(CEPR, 2016), hence, crisis assumes a value of 1 from 2008Q1 until 2011Q3 and zero 
otherwise. The model with the dummy variable becomes: 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝐵1𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐵2𝑟𝑢𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐵3𝑦ℎ𝑔𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐵4𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐵5𝑖𝑛𝑐𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2 + 𝐵6𝑟𝑢𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2 + 𝐵7𝑦ℎ𝑔𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2
+ 𝐵8𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑈,𝑡−1 + 𝐵9𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑈,𝑡−1 + 𝐵10𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
+ 𝐵11𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝐵12𝑟𝑢𝑖,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝐵13𝑦ℎ𝑔𝑖,𝑡−2
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝐵14𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝐵15𝑖𝑛𝑐𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
+ 𝐵16𝑟𝑢𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝐵17𝑦ℎ𝑔𝐸𝑈,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
+ 𝐵18𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑈,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝐵19𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑈,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … ,5, 𝑡 = 1, … ,65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3.5.2) 
By multiplying the dummy variable with the rest of variables we are able to estimate the 
coefficients for all of the predictors in the financial crisis and compare them with the full 
                                                          
3 http://cepr.org/content/euro-area-business-cycle-dating-committee.   
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sample estimates. We also include the variable crisis on its own to test the significance of the 
structural change sparked by the crisis. 
We use the panel regression specification because it boosts the power of our statistical 
analysis by allowing us to exploit both cross-sectional and time-series variations in country-
level portfolio returns and country-level predictors. Since the number of coefficient estimates 
in our model (9 in the baseline model, 20 with the dummies) exceeds the number of cross-
sections (5), we are not able to estimate panel regressions with random effects. Therefore, 
we estimate the pooled (population averaged) model and the fixed effects model using a 
consistent estimator for our covariance matrix. 
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4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
We run the regression in EViews using the OLS panel data specification, Table 3 presents 
the estimation output and effects tests. 
Table 3: Estimation output and effects tests 
Variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
C 16.88357*** 
(4.894) 
15.99231*** 
(4.956557) 
INC(-2) -26.48847 
(44.18449) 
-14.57419 
(46.01833) 
RU(-2) 8.85614** 
(4.3307) 
11.51191** 
(5.511067) 
YHG(-2) 41.83477 
(32.27203) 
53.68242 
(40.61183) 
DIV(-1) -10.01499 
(118.0176) 
38.28407 
(144.6783) 
INCEU(-2) -392.5264*** 
(55.64644) 
-378.3644*** 
(56.60202) 
RUEU(-2) -24.65793*** 
(7.510572) 
-27.36691*** 
(8.495444) 
YHGEU(-2) 171.6369*** 
(39.10277) 
157.4663*** 
(47.86832) 
TERM(-1) 1.295142* 
(0.746971) 
1.292566* 
(0.753796) 
BORROW(-1) 1.230324 
(0.847474) 
1.275453 
(0.865202) 
Crisis -37.21823*** 
(12.43005) 
-36.42596*** 
(12.00095) 
INC(-2)* Crisis 113.48 
(120.8961) 
73.31238 
(125.6258) 
RU(-2)* Crisis -14.44235** 
(5.687707) 
-16.70542** 
(6.663876) 
YHG(-2)* Crisis -47.83932 
(64.57487) 
-38.94848 
(67.13811) 
DIV(-1)* Crisis 540.2953** 
(244.7162) 
492.7157* 
(269.3975) 
INCEU(-2)* Crisis -1735.756*** 
(501.8676) 
-1737.466*** 
(500.6576) 
RUEU(-2)* Crisis 25.7072** 
(11.2335) 
28.43408** 
(11.90614) 
YHGEU(-2)* Crisis 1262.625*** 
(134.7689) 
1262.029*** 
(131.9174) 
TERM(-1)* Crisis 10.77365*** 
(2.267407) 
10.6521*** 
(2.343779) 
BORROW(-1)* Crisis 19.83291*** 
(1.967409) 
19.84583*** 
(2.01218) 
R2 0.266882 0.268716 
Adjusted R2 0.221212 0.212838 
F-Statistic 5.843741 4.808912 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
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Effects Tests  Statistic Prob. 
Cross-section F  0.188787 0.9442 
Cross-section Chi-square  0.814339 0.9365 
Note. This table presents the estimates of equation (3.5.2) using both pooled OLS and fixed effects models. The 
standard errors are presented between parenthesis under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is 
represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. We aim from this regression to predict country residual 
returns from a benchmark risk free rate in quarter t using lagged variables from quarters t-1 and t-2. inc, ru and 
yhg are the country level macroeconomic indicators employed from quarter t-2 and representing income growth, 
relative unemployment rate and yearly growth in a house price index respectively. inceu, rueu and yhgeu are 
the same indicators on a Eurozone level, also utilized with a lag of two quarters. div is defined as log (1+dividend 
yield) of country portfolios employed from quarter t-1, term and borrow are the term spread and borrowing 
spread respectively also lagged by one quarter. crisis is a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 in the 
financial crisis (2008Q1-2011Q3) and zero otherwise; crisis on its own allows us to test the significance of the 
structural change brought by the crisis, whereas when multiplied by the rest of the variables it allows estimating 
the coefficient of the predictors and their significance in the period of the crisis exclusively. The last part of the 
table shows the redundant fixed effects tests performed in the fixed effects model to examine the significance 
of individuality between the five countries. 
The F-statistics and the associated p-values reject the null hypothesis of insignificance in 
both the pooled OLS and fixed effects models. Thus, the variables we use in the regression 
specification can jointly predict stock returns in our sample of European countries. The 
dummy variable crisis is statistically significant at a 1% level of significance in both 
regression specifications which confirms the presence of a structural change in the model 
during the financial crisis4. 
We use redundant fixed effects tests in the fixed effects model to test the joint significance 
of the fixed estimates. The statistic values of both F and Chi-square tests as well as the 
associated p-values fail to reject the null that cross-section effects are redundant indicating 
that the heterogeneity between the tested countries is insignificant. Therefore, we consider 
the population-averaged pooled regression model as the main model for our analysis. One 
alternative is to run the country by country regressions in which all indictors are allowed to 
have country specific estimates; we estimate those regressions and the results are shown in 
appendix C. Probability of Wald F-statistic equals zero for all country-level regressions 
suggesting that the global significance is preserved even when the model is performed for 
each country individually and corrected for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We 
                                                          
4 Appendix B shows the graphs of all the variables we employ, the structural change confirmed by the model 
is also visible in the graphs. 
24 
 
rely on the pooled regression specification in our analysis instead of the country-level 
regressions because the pooled model boosts the power of our statistical analysis by allowing 
us to exploit both cross-sectional and time-series variations in country-level portfolio returns 
and country-level predictors. Additionally, pooling the observations in a panel data setting 
solves correlation and small sample problems of country-level regressions, which grants our 
inference more validity. 
Considering the full sample estimates; out of the three main country-level return predictors 
only relative unemployment ru is statistically significant at a 5% level of significance. Both 
the negative coefficient estimate of country labor income growth inc and positive coefficient 
estimate of country relative unemployment rate ru are consistent with the conclusion of Fama 
and French (1989) that expected returns are higher (lower) when economic conditions are 
weak (strong). Fama and French (1989) studied the relation between business conditions and 
expected returns on stocks and bonds and suggested that variations in expected returns are 
opposite to business cycle conditions. The authors presented the following economic stories 
for their findings:   
i. When income is high (low) investors attempt to smooth their future consumption 
patterns by saving more (less), this higher (lower) desired saving leads to lower 
(higher) expected returns in absence of an offsetting increase (decrease) in investment 
opportunities.  
ii. Business condition indicators proxy for risks that are higher (lower) when times are 
poor (good), therefore securities must offer higher (lower) returns in those times. 
iii. Some of the variation in expected returns is generated by the business cycle 
productivity shocks. 
The results we obtain for country-level labor income growth inc and country-level relative 
unemployment rate ru confirm the counter-cyclicality of stock returns documented in the 
U.S. and UK5. Higher (lower) labor income reflects stronger (weaker) economic conditions 
and predicts lower (higher) returns, therefore the estimated coefficient of inc assumes a 
                                                          
5 Fama and French (1989) in the U.S., Velazquez and Smith (2013) in the UK 
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negative sign. Conversely, higher (lower) unemployment reflects weaker (stronger) 
economic conditions and predicts higher (lower) returns, therefore the estimated coefficient 
of ru assumes a positive sign. 
In contrast to the country-level predictors, their analogous Eurozone measures have stronger 
and more significant estimates. The negative sign of labor income growth is preserved when 
considering the Eurozone measure whereas the positive sign of relative unemployment is not. 
We are not able to provide a theoretical framework for these two Eurozone variables similar 
to the one we provided for their analogous country level measures because our sample does 
not cover all Eurozone countries; Eurozone economic expansion (contraction) might predict 
lower (higher) stock returns for Eurozone countries on average, however this does not imply 
that it should predict lower (higher) stock returns for each subset of Eurozone countries. The 
variable yhgeu we use to capture house price changes in the Eurozone and to proxy for the 
housing collateral ratio (hy) of Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) has a significantly 
positive estimate which is theoretically plausible. Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) 
reasoned that a decrease in house prices decreases the collateral value of houses which 
increases investors’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk and raises the conditional market price of 
risk, thus a decline in the U.S. hy leads to higher market return. Using the same theoretical 
framework, we can conjecture that a decline in the Eurozone hy leads to higher market return; 
higher Eurozone market return results in a lower country residual return because the latter is 
approximately the difference between the raw country return and the market return. This is 
indeed the case in our model. 
The two conclusions we draw from our return predictability regressions are (i) country level 
business cycle indicators are not robust predictors of country stock returns in Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, France and Germany, and (ii) the Eurozone counterparts of these indicators incorporate 
more valuable information about future country-level stock returns in the aforementioned 
countries. The results of our regressions are exactly the opposite of those obtained by 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013); the authors found that two of the three main state-level 
predictors are significant whereas all of their U.S. counterparts are not.  
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Why country-level business cycle variables fail to predict country returns in our sample of 
European countries whereas state-level indicators can significantly predict state returns in the 
U.S.?  
The reasoning we provide for this phenomenon is that the percentage of household financial 
assets (shares and other equity) of total financial assets is much smaller in our sample of 
European countries when compared to the U.S. In other words, equity market wealth 
represents a much lower percentage of household’s net worth in Portugal, Spain, Italy, France 
and Germany than in the U.S. Therefore, even when temporary country-level economic 
fluctuations in the business cycle affect household’s investment decisions and alter their 
required rates of return on financial assets; this effect does not propagate to the stock market 
because there are not many households who own stocks. Figure 2 shows household shares 
and other equity as a percentage of total financial assets in the European countries we analyze 
as well as in the U.S. between the years 1999-2014. 
Figure 2: Household shares and other equity, % of total financial assets, 1999-2014 
  
Source. OECD (2016)6, reproduced.  
Note. Figure 2 shows household shares and other equity as a percentage of total financial assets between 1999 
and 2014 in Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the U.S. We use this figure to show that stock market 
wealth accounts for a lower percentage of household’s net worth in our sample of European countries than in 
                                                          
6 Data is available at https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-financial-assets.htm. 
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the U.S. which makes it is harder in those countries for temporary economic fluctuations to propagate to the 
stock market through household demand shocks. 
The portion of shares and other equity owned by households as a percentage of total financial 
assets is always superior in the U.S. than in our sample of European countries for the whole 
1999-2014 period. The superiority in comparing percentage terms reflects even greater and 
more important superiority when comparing absolute terms because the value of total 
financial assets in the U.S. is much bigger than in the other countries even after correcting 
for population differences. To illustrate the size difference, we graph the per capita dollar 
value of total market capitalization of all domestic listed companies in each of the countries 
we study as well as in the U.S between the years 1999-2014. Figure 3 shows the results. 
Figure 3: Market capitalization of all listed domestic companies, USD/capita, 1999-2014 
 
Source. Author’s calculations based The World Bank data7 (2016). 
Note. Figure 3 shows the per capita dollar value of total market capitalization of all domestic listed companies 
in Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the U.S. between the years 1999-2014. We multiply annual 
values of total market capitalization of listed domestic companies (% of GDP) by the annual GDP per capita in 
each of the countries to get the per capita market capitalization. The findings of figures 2 and 3 indicate that 
stock market wealth accounts for a much higher percentage of household’s net worth in the U.S. than in 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. Because both the percentage of total financial assets owned by 
households in the form of equity (figure 2) and the per capita value of available equity (figure 3) are superior 
in the U.S. 
                                                          
7 Data is available at:             
http://beta.data.worldbank.org/?end=2014&indicators=CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS&start=1999 and 
http://beta.data.worldbank.org/?end=2014&indicators=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD&start=1999   
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The reasoning we just presented is similar to the one used by Hamburg et al. (2005) to justify 
the contradiction between their findings in Germany and findings of analogous studies in the 
U.S., UK and Australia. Hamburg et al. (2005) found that the consumption-wealth (cay) ratio 
fails to predict stock market fluctuations in German data, which contradicts the robust and 
well-documented forecasting power of cay in the Anglo-Saxon economies (e.g. Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001) in the U.S., Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2003) in the UK). The authors 
concluded the following: 
“But whereas earlier studies for the U.S., Australia and the UK have documented that this 
cointegrating relationship predicts changes in asset prices, in particular risk premia in the 
stock market, we find that cay mainly predicts income changes in German data. Our 
explanation for this phenomenon is that stock market wealth accounts for a much smaller 
share of household net worth in Germany than in the Anglo Saxon economies so that 
temporary fluctuations in stock markets have only very limited impact on German private 
household net worth. We have interpreted this observation in the light of well-documented 
structural differences in the financial and pension systems of continental Europe and the 
Anglo-Saxon economies.” (Hamburg et al., 2005, p. 23) 
One can argue that if households cannot drive prices when local economic conditions 
fluctuate, other local stock owners (e.g. institutional investors) should be able to affect stock 
prices especially that our sample of European countries fulfil the criterion of high local stock 
ownership. The evidence we find so far does not seem to support this argument because: (i) 
local economic indicators are not statistically significant predictors of local stock returns and 
(ii) the trading activity is lower in our sample of European economies than in the U.S.  This 
is illustrated in figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Total value of stocks traded, % of GDP, 1999-2014 
 
Source. The World Bank8 (2016), reproduced. 
Note. Figure 4 shows the total value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP in Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, 
Germany and the U.S. We use this figure to show that the trading activity is lower in our sample of European 
economies than in the U.S. Therefore, it is less likely that the predictable patterns we detect in stock returns are 
induced by trading shocks. 
 
The total value of stocks traded is superior in the U.S. to that in our sample of European 
countries, hence it is less likely that the predictable patterns we detect in stock returns are 
induced by trading shocks. However, even if we assume that the predictable patterns in 
country stock returns are generated by the current trading activity, this trading does not seem 
to be caused by country level fluctuations in the business cycle. On the contrary, the evidence 
we find suggests that if this is the case then it is induced by fluctuations in the Eurozone 
business cycle because Eurozone indicators are much more significant predictors of country 
stock returns than their country-level counterparts. This contradicts the findings of Korniotis 
and Kumar (2013) that U.S. indicators are usually insignificant and weaker than their state 
analogous measures. 
                                                          
8 Data is available at: http://beta.data.worldbank.org/?indicators=CM.MKT.TRAD.GD.ZS 
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Why can aggregate Eurozone business cycle variables significantly predict country-returns 
in our sample of European countries whereas aggregate U.S. indicators fail to predict state 
returns as documented by Korniotis and Kumar (2013)? 
The period covered by our study was marked by several economic developments that granted 
EU indicators more significant predictive power than their country-level counterparts. In 
particular: (i) the macroeconomic and financial convergence associated with introducing the 
euro as a single currency on the first of January 1999, (ii) the increase in regional equity bias 
to the detriment of home bias associated with the same event and (iii) the increased financial 
contagion9 phenomenon caused by the dotcom bubble10, global financial crisis and European 
debt crisis. 
Financial and economic convergence of the Eurozone economies in the late 90s is a highly 
documented phenomenon. Kim et al. (2005) studied the Eurozone stock markets integration 
and found that both return and volatility spillovers hiked during the period featured by 
introducing the euro as a single currency, they documented evidence of increased stock 
market comovements and showed that much of this increase is caused by the macroeconomic 
convergence brought by adopting the euro as a single currency. Figure 5 shows the time 
varying conditional correlations estimated by the authors using bivariate EGARCH models; 
the correlations measure comovements as well as integration between country index returns 
and the EMU regional core for Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Financial contagion is defined as the transmission of a shock in excess of what can be explained by economic 
fundamentals (Pritsker, 2001). 
10 The dotcom started to burst in March 2000 which is around the start of our sample. 
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Figure 5: Time varying correlations and stock market integration, 1989-2003 
  
  
 
Source. Kim et al. (2005), reproduced. 
Note. Figure 5 shows the time varying conditional correlations used by the authors to measure comovements 
and integration of the underlying stock index returns in Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany with the 
EMU (European Monetary Union) regional core. Countries with high market capitalization such as Germany, 
France and Italy appear to be more integrated because their conditional correlations assume relatively higher 
values. The shift in 1996-1997 that sparked a rapid increase in integration coincided with the final stages of 
Amsterdam treaty aiming to help EU countries fulfil amendments to the Maastricht treaty (Kim et al., 2005). 
Hardouvelis et al. (2006) conjectured that the harmonization efforts by EU countries to fulfil 
the Maastricht criteria for joining the Eurozone have led to both nominal and real 
convergence of European economies; nominal convergence is the progressive convergence 
of long-term interest rates and inflation towards German levels, whereas real convergence is 
the increased business cycle synchronization across European economies. The 
synchronization in business cycles could have induced higher inter-country correlations in 
the expected component of real corporate earnings according to the authors. Therefore, we 
conjecture that the European Monetary Union policies aiming to converge the European 
economies as well introducing the euro as a single currency have granted the Eurozone 
indicators a significant predictive and explanatory power of country stock returns. 
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In addition to the macroeconomic convergence and increased stock market comovements, 
the introduction of the euro was accompanied by an increase in regional bias to the detriment 
of home bias for euro area countries which made European investors more exposed to 
regional indicators. Table 4 shows the equity home bias as well as the regional bias towards 
EU-13 equities for Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany in 1997, 2001 and 2004. 
Table 4: Equity home bias and regional bias towards EU-13 equities, 1997, 2001 & 2004  
 Equity Home bias Regional Bias Towards EU-13 Equities 
 1997 2001 2004 1997 2001 2004 
Portugal 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.33 0.65 0.80 
Spain 0.95 0.89 0.93 0.33 0.72 0.73 
Italy 0.89 0.80 0.85 0.53 0.48 0.52 
France 0.90 0.85 0.79 0.48 0.59 0.74 
Germany 0.83 0.77 0.77 0.55 0.59 0.62 
Source. Schoenmaker and Bosch (2008), reproduced. 
Note. Table 4 shows the equity home bias levels as well as the levels of regional bias towards EU-13 equities 
for Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. Unlike the decrease in equity home bias, the increase in regional 
bias towards EU-13 equities was much more profound and permanent. We suggest that the increase in regional 
bias and the relative decrease in home bias has contributed to granting regional indicators a more significant 
role in predicting country-level returns than their analogous country-level measures. 
Table 5 presents an alternative approach to highlight the increase in regional exposure 
associated with introducing the euro as a single currency. It shows the share of EMU 
(European economic and monetary union) equities in the foreign and total portfolios of 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Germany in the years 1997, 2001 and 2005. 
Table 5: Share of EMU equities in country foreign and total portfolios, 1997, 2001 & 2005 
 EMU Equities in Foreign Portfolio EMU Equities in Total Portfolio 
 1997 2001 2005 1997 2001 2005 
Portugal 0.540  0.655 0.683 0.077  0.121 0.175 
Spain 0.456 0.542 0.733 0.042  0.075 0.14 
Italy 0.539  0.642 0.721 0.121  0.231 0.303 
France 0.390  0.511 0.505 0.066  0.100 0.160 
Germany 0.626  0.596 0.700 0.134  0.183 0.276 
Source. De Santis and Gérard (2009), reproduced. 
Note. Table 5 shows the share of EMU equities in foreign and total country portfolios for the countries included 
in our sample. Introducing the euro as a single currency in the year 1999 sparked an increasing trend in 
investor’s holdings of EMU equities and increased investors’ exposure to the Eurozone economic conditions. 
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The second reason we provide for our findings is that, during the period covered by our study, 
the Eurozone has witnessed several crises resulting in an increased financial contagion 
between its economies. Kenourgios et al. (2009) examined the time-varying correlation in 
European equity and bond markets (Euro Area, the Balkans and Central Europe) and found 
an increase in the dependence level during the dotcom bubble. Samitas and Tsakalos (2013) 
studied stock market contagion in a sample of eight European countries (including all the 
five countries we analyze) and found that the subprime crisis has increased the correlation 
between stock returns, whereas the Greek debt crisis has had a lower effect on those 
correlations. Similarly, Kazi et al. (2014) used a multivariate asymmetric dynamic 
conditional correlation model to study shift-contagion in the stock returns of 16 OECD 
countries (including four out of the five countries we analyze) during the global financial 
crises and the European debt crisis, their findings confirmed shift-contagion in the former but 
found no strong evidence during the latter.  
The financial contagion phenomenon and the increased correlation between equity returns in 
the Eurozone economies induced by the dotcom bubble, the global crisis and to a lesser extent 
the Greek debt crisis have given the Eurozone economic indicators a more important role in 
predicting country-returns than their country-level counterparts. This is illustrated in the 
estimation output presented in the beginning of the section; most of the Eurozone indicators 
preserve signs and become more significant in the financial crisis whereas all of the country-
level indicators reverse signs11. Therefore, we conjecture that the global financial crisis has 
weakened the predictive power of country-level indicators and strengthened that of the 
Eurozone ones. Korniotis and Kumar (2013) documented an opposing evidence in the U.S. 
partially because their sample covers the period 1983-2008 and thus misses the financial 
crisis. Korniotis (2008) showed that it is more rational to describe the U.S. economy as a 
collection of 50-state investors rather than one U.S. level investor because some state-specific 
risks are not fully shared across states, that does not seem to be the case with the Eurozone 
                                                          
11 The country variable div defined as log (1+dividend yield) of country portfolios becomes positive and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the literature (e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1988)). 
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economies in the 1999-2015 period considering the progressive shocks and policies targeting 
more economic and financial convergence. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we derive the return series of value weighted country portfolios for Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, France and Germany. Then we compute the residual return from a benchmark 
market risk free rate to examine whether country-level stock returns exhibit predictable 
business cycle patterns that can be potentially exploited. We find evidence suggesting that 
country-level business cycles fail to predict stock returns whereas aggregate Eurozone 
business cycles demonstrate a significant predictive ability for country-level equity residual 
returns. 
Our results contradict those of analogous studies performed in the U.S. Korniotis and Kumar 
(2013) found that state-level business cycles can significantly predict state-stock returns 
whereas aggregate U.S. level cycles cannot. We present two main economic justifications for 
this contradiction. First, stock market wealth accounts for a much lower percentage of 
households’ net worth in continental Europe than in the U.S., therefore, it is harder for short-
run economic fluctuations to propagate to the stock market even if they affect households’ 
investment decisions. Second, the period covered by our study was marked by several 
economic developments that granted EU indicators more significant predictive power than 
their country-level counterparts. In particular: (i) introducing the euro as a single currency on 
the first of January 1999 which led to macroeconomic and financial convergence of Eurozone 
economies as well as to a higher regional equity bias to the detriment of home bias of 
European investors and (ii) the increased financial contagion phenomenon between EU 
equity markets induced by the dotcom bubble, global financial crisis and to a lesser extent 
the European debt crisis. We present those justifications in the light of well-documented 
structural differences in the equity ownership structure between the economies of continental 
Europe and the U.S. as well as the evidence of economic and financial convergence and 
increased regional equity bias between the EU economies within the 1999-2015 period. 
The study has significant contributions to the literature because it is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first to examine predictable business cycle swings of stock returns in 
continental Europe. Despite the relevance of the topic and the abundant evidence in the UK 
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and the U.S. the literature seems to lack evidence from continental Europe, our study partially 
fills this gap. 
Our findings have significant implications for investors using macroeconomic trading 
strategies to time the European equity markets because we find evidence suggesting that 
Eurozone business cycle indicators incorporate more valuable information about future 
country-level returns than their country-level counterparts. Therefore, investors should rely 
more on Eurozone indicators in timing the European equity markets. 
We have several suggestions for future research. First, it is intriguing (though challenging) 
to increase the sample size of the study by including all Eurozone economies in the analysis 
regardless of the local equity ownership criterion. Second, it is also interesting to extend the 
sample for the countries in which economic data are available for a longer time span, then 
analyze the responsiveness of equity returns to country and regional business cycles before 
and after adopting the euro as a single currency in the 1999. Finally, data to calculate the cay 
ratio are available for Spain through FEP databases, therefore it is possible to analyze the 
predictive power for the cay ratio in Spain and compare the results with similar studies done 
in the U.S., UK and Germany12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) in the U.S., Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2003) in the UK and Hamburg et al. 
(2005) in Germany. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Portfolios’ Specifications 
 
Table 6: Identifiers of excluded stocks 
Portugal Spain Italy France       Germany     
FENU.LS ALCE.SCT CUCI.MI AUER.PA MLCTA.PA ALGAU.PA MLCLP.PA ADLG.DE DNIG.BE SYWGn.BE 
COPM.LS S1023.MC ITPG.PK CHFP.PA QTE.PA VIA.PA MLMNR.PA BFIG.BE HZHG.BE 5TRG.H 
TRAAP.LS S0314.MC ALWOO.PA FINM.PA EDDS.PA LTWN.SI MLCSV.PA KWGG.DE IRPG.H BGZG.H 
CDUL.LS FOBE.SCT YIV.MI CROS.PA ATAR.PA MLEDU.PA MLCMI.PA HABG.DE BG1An.BE BEZ.DE 
AGDCU.LS GAES.SCT SOST.PK DVSP.PA ALGEP.PA MLCHE.PA MLAKD.PA BHSG.F EUE15PEX.L MMH.H 
ALISA.LS S2293.MC MLAZL.PA LFVE.PA DPTP.PA LYXLEM.PA MLERI.PA MTVG.DE RUCG.MU MLECO.PA 
ALNOR.LS S0987.MC MLMCE.PA FAUV.PA REGR.PA MLFCI.PA MLSIL.PA MUKG.F SU3G.BE RE0.D 
 S2975.MC MLFIH.PA FFBP.PA PATC.PA BVI.PA MLONL.PA NAKG.H D2BG.BE ZEITg.F 
 UCAV.SCT MLEBX.PA FCCH.PA CJSP.PA MLVST.PA MLVOV.PA PKBG.F P4OG.DE SXMUUSD.DE 
 S2418.MC MLLB.PA CRPP.PA RDGP.PA MLMAI.PA MLAMA.PA RKBG.F I8CKk.H S26G.D 
 S0239.MC MLSMP.PA RXPA.PA ROUC.PA MLTRS.PA MLNOT.PA SWAG.DE MLPRO.PA ETPGg.F 
 S1707.MC MLSNT.PA GMDS.PA ARTE.PA MLARI.PA MLGAL.PA SING.F IR1.MU RUSSINAVEUR.DE 
 S2913.MC MLHTT.PA AREIT.PA PNOV.PA MLETA.PA MLANT.PA SPRGn.DE SXAREX.L VUAG.D 
 S2962.MC EMCC.MI FSDV.PA FORG.PA ALAST.PA MLPSH.PA ZILGn.DE SXFREX.L 7PVG.H 
 CLEO.MC  SCMX.PA AUCP.PA MLPVG.PA ALSFT.PA SGSG.D SXIREX.L 28LG.H 
 ISUR.MC  MRM.PA AMOS.PA MLEAV.PA NANOB.PA HRPKk.DE SXKREX.L SAXG.DE 
 BOBI.SCT  TYNN.PA ALCES.PA ALROC.PA MLACT.PA EFSG.MU SXMREX.L RNM.F 
 S2864.MC  EFEP.PA JAJP.PA MLABO.PA MLAFT.PA COPMa.DE SXNREX.L 7PR.F 
 S1060.MC  TWVG.PA PRSW.PA LVC.PA MLSOC.PA SXDEEX.L SXOREX.L BEUT.PK 
 S1350.MC  BLBP.PA ITXA.PA MLTHA.PA MLIFC.PA BMMG.DE SXPREX.L STOXX50ENAV.DE 
 S2594.MC  MDEL.PA STID.PA MLMTD.PA MLCET.PA NWXG.DE SXQREX.L BNNn.DE 
 S2148.MC  VDPS.PA NR21.BR MLNES.PA MLDDP.PA SD1.DE SXRREX.L SHVA.DE 
 MNSA.SCT  KRNI.PA KZBO.PA LMAL.SI MLCOL.PA UBKG.MU SXTREX.L FTSEEX.L 
 S1692.MC  MCLC.PA CARPD.PA MLJSA.PA MLJAN.PA ADWG.H SX3REX.L AMMG.D 
 RONS.SCT  ARDPa.PA DPUY.PA ALACR.PA MLTBM.PA BIWG.DE SX7REX.L MUXG.DE 
 S3094.MC  EFIN.PA DRIS.PA ALTXC.PA ETZ.PA EMH1k.DE SX8REX.L  
 S2280.MC  CHSS.PA DJE.PA ALSOA.PA MLVIN.PA CMBGn.F SX6REX.L  
 S1676.MC  COUP.PA TNRC.PA MLRIV.PA MLEMG.PA MGUGg.D SX4REX.L  
 S0720.MC  GRLE.PA KIMP.PA MLAMY.PA FGA.PA EKKG.BE NDXEX.DE  
 4PU.F  FNMM.PA DJTK.PA CM9.PA MLPPI.PA ABAG.DE DJAPSDEEX.DE 
 YARE.MC  BLEE.PA ALACI.PA MLVAN.PA MLDHZ.PA BEPG.BE DJCHOS50EX.DE 
 YPR3.MC  HOIN.PA MAKE.PA MLDEX.PA MLAUD.PA AAGGn.F H1IG.SG  
 YHAB.MC  HOMJ.PA EVER.PA MLCRO.PA MLORC.PA EBKG.DE E4D.TG  
   HYPB.PA ALEUP.PA MLMII.PA MLHCF.PA MGNG.DE L1AG.H  
   IPPP.PA CHPO.PA MLACP.PA MLAGI.PA MFCG.H E2NG.MU  
   SIPH.PA USTE.PA ALQGC.PA MLARO.PA PPAG.DE W8ZG.F  
   ESTR.PA ALLOG.PA MLAAE.PA ML350.PA PLEKk.F SREPEX.L  
   LCLG.PA PGOA.PA MLWEY.PA MLPPF.PA ELNk.F M7C.D  
   CBSM.PA TLDS.PA MLMGL.PA MLVAL.PA CPUGk.F CDZG.MU  
   NPRI.PA WTRA.PA S13.S MLITG.PA BYBKk.BE M5SG.BE  
   PIMP.PA MLNOV.PA S5B.S MLDTB.PA MYRKk.DE A3EB.SG  
   PRCH.PA ALKEY.PA ALEUA.PA BBEU.PA SOOG.MU NSAG.D  
   TRAM.PA LOCA.PA MLKRI.PA ALIMR.PA WEG1.DE APQG.D  
   SIGS.PA MLTE.PA ALISC.PA SMRE.PA SRWG.H BIY.MU  
   SPBS.PA MLCOR.PA CSWCHF.S MLOSA.PA KSWG.F BLGGgi.F  
   UMHS.PA MLRAM.PA MLSIS.PA MLBRI.PA BTGGg.F CVK.D  
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   VERN.PA MLATV.PA MLLEA.PA ALCYB.PA VVVGn_p.DE MADAXGLASNAV.DE 
   DIGP.PA MLFER.PA MLART.PA BLIM.PA MDAXIEX.DE HHXG.H  
   3CHN.PA MLOPT.PA LYSLE.S MLMAD.PA SWEGn.DE 3GOK.MU  
   SECN.PA WLD.PA IFNG.L ALPGG.PA CCBG.MU 3SQ1.BE  
   BAUD.PA ALVIA.PA LYSSL.S MLEES.PA GBQG.H 5BMG.H  
   MLSCH.PA       
Note. Table 6 shows the list of identifiers of all the stocks we exclude from country portfolios. We retrieve 
quarterly stock return and market capitalization data for all stocks headquartered in the country and having a 
minimum market capitalization of 45000 USD from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Return and capitalization values 
for some of the stocks were inconsistent even retrieved individually; we exclude those stocks from the analysis. 
 
Table 7: Value of market capitalization included in the portfolios 
 Retrieved Mkt Cap Excluded Included % Included 
Portugal 52,180,188,009.03 192,219,137.55 51,987,968,871.47 99.63162429 
Spain 635,179,211,031.93 1,924,571,469.48 633,254,639,562.45 99.69700339 
Italy 520,225,558,903.24 357,322,390.79 519,868,236,512.45 99.93131395 
France 1,982,406,621,769.33 20,703,535,063.22 1,961,703,086,706.11 98.9556363 
Germany 1,816,676,231,951.50 55,632,092,733.98 1,761,044,139,217.52 96.93769909 
Note. Table 7 shows the total market capitalization of all filtered companies as well as the value of market 
capitalization included in each portfolio. The final portfolios represent at least 96% of the total market 
capitalization of all filtered companies, therefore, the return series we use in this study are representative of the 
country-level return series and much broader than stock market indices. 
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Appendix B – Graphs of the Variables 
 
Figure 6: Graph of labor income growth 
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Figure 7: Graph of relative unemployment 
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
RUPT RUES RUIT
RUFR RUBD RUEU  
46 
 
Figure 8: Graph of housing prices growth 
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Figure 9: Graph of country-portfolios dividend yield 
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Figure 10: Graph of term and borrowing Spreads 
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Note. We intend from showing the graphs of all the variables to highlight the structural change brought by the 
financial crisis. The estimation output shows that this structural shock is substantial because the dummy variable 
is statistically significant at a 1% level of significance. inc represents the growth rate of labor income defined 
as the log difference of labor income in the current quarter and the same quarter in the previous year. ru is 
relative unemployment calculated as the ratio of the current level of unemployment to the moving average of 
unemployment rate in the past 16 quarters. yhg is the yearly growth in housing prices defined as the log 
difference between housing prices index value in the current quarter and the same quarter in the previous year. 
div is the control variable capturing dividend yield and defined as log of 1+DY of country portfolios. term is 
the term spread calculated as the return difference between AAA-Eurozone 10-year government bond and 
AAA-Eurozone 1-year government bond. borrow is the borrowing spread defined as the difference between 
Eurozone average corporate borrowing rate and Eurozone average government long-term bond yields. inc, ru, 
yhg and div are followed by the respective country or Eurozone symbol; PT=Portugal, ES=Spain, IT=Italy, 
FR=France, BD=Germany and EU=Eurozone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Appendix C – Country-Level Regressions  
 
Table 8: Country-level regressions, estimation output 
 Portugal Spain Italy France Germany 
C 24.78505 7.910683 17.30938 58.22361* -3.59655 
 (38.38592) (29.75382) (31.1161) (31.83704) (52.14427) 
INC(-2) -135.401 11.50616 -288.458 141.9878 115.4154 
 (195.252) (177.7457) (251.1144) (327.2431) (413.6427) 
RU(-2) 36.60921** -17.572 2.724397 31.22083 -12.686 
 (14.08851) (17.23942) (19.54987) (28.07729) (49.27059) 
YHG(-2) 227.3646 93.58786 -141.365 583.6188** 97.88727 
 (244.9024) (144.8898) (156.6482) (234.4143) (315.9117) 
DIV(-1) 94.96977 172.0733 -226.593 -307.374 1320.546* 
 (277.3237) (417.9685) (415.4801) (332.6759) (659.0712) 
INCEU(-2) 48.11599 -433.807 -252.749 -512.524 -171.68 
 (707.4614) (545.974) (523.0377) (407.9636) (846.8347) 
RUEU(-2) -74.7449** 17.12323 -19.7889 -91.8838* -5.8325 
 (29.33458) (28.20306) (31.20424) (49.75956) (71.37851) 
YHGEU(-2) -30.3438 -127.174 586.0189 -1023.48** 492.8269 
 (175.6075) (392.7407) (349.1069) (508.0412) (496.558) 
TERM(-1) 4.322273 -2.7446 3.139564 6.03746 0.892225 
 (4.151591) (3.157469) (2.806625) (3.894174) (3.737528) 
BORROW(-1) 5.620837 -2.67701 -0.95871 7.544699 2.119641 
 (4.619898) (4.187577) (2.721171) (5.101514) (6.623714) 
DUMMY -71.8823 21.60923 -109.83 -174.965*** 24.50183 
 (60.22672) (63.89998) (75.79161) (63.56631) (57.63698) 
INC(-2)*DUMMY 1149.92 -2415.76 -1451.1 -1436.28 3756.283*** 
 (756.2871) (1812.287) (2345.282) (1794.686) (741.7041) 
RU(-2)*DUMMY -63.918 162.3793 25.89019 -141.844 -28.6351 
 (59.06549) (112.8219) (67.79866) (127.9317) (54.4538) 
YHG(-2)*DUMMY -375.537 5161.881** 846.0129 -2154.49 -3281.27*** 
 (672.4887) (2092.175) (1492.674) (1324.08) (445.5626) 
DIV(-1)*DUMMY 217.4275 1336.345 351.7174 -335.503 3435.049*** 
 (1006.873) (1311.924) (642.0684) (2006.214) (741.642) 
INCEU(-2)*DUMMY 680.1916 6496.956 -443.53 -1277.15 -9955.19*** 
 (1401.346) (3915.013) (3193.738) (2090.884) (1195.189) 
RUEU(-2)*DUMMY 87.36606* -250.785 56.94946 293.7895* -69.4912 
 (49.57368) (167.696) (115.9545) (147.818) (73.04957) 
YHGEU(-2)*DUMMY 408.5052 -5277.78* 1000.732 7486.383** 5805.392*** 
 (586.5143) (2635.415) (1005.409) (2858.844) (596.9478) 
TERM(-1)*DUMMY 17.1121** 14.44778* 9.136811 14.08006 33.27242*** 
 (6.770548) (8.043938) (6.239489) (15.76704) (5.234326) 
BORROW(-1)*DUMMY -3.0345 -46.41* 25.92331 15.65289 29.87202*** 
 (7.450292) (26.34724) (16.86057) (18.7047) (6.99894) 
R2 0.375145 0.420169 0.428138 0.391854 0.354808 
Adjusted R2 0.111318 0.175352 0.186686 0.135082 0.082394 
Wald F-Statistic 289.2521 56.22876 23.23987 30.34687 251.6478 
Prob (Wald F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 0 
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Note. We intend from running the country-level regressions to show that the global significance is preserved 
when the model is applied for each country individually and corrected for both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. This is reflected in a probability of Wald F-statistic that equals zero for all countries. Despite 
the significance of the model on a country level we rely on the pooled regression specification in our analysis 
because it boosts the power of our statistical analysis by allowing us to exploit both cross-sectional and time-
series variations in country-level portfolio returns and country-level predictors. Moreover, pooling the 
observations in a panel data setting solves correlation and small sample problems of country-level regressions, 
which grants our inference more validity. The notation in this table is similar to that in table 3: inc, ru and yhg 
are the country level macroeconomic indicators employed from quarter t-2 and representing income growth, 
relative unemployment rate and yearly growth in a house price index respectively. inceu, rueu and yhgeu are 
the same indicators on a Eurozone level, also utilized with a lag of two quarters. div is defined as log (1+dividend 
yield) of country portfolios employed from quarter t-1, term and borrow are the term spread and borrowing 
spread respectively also lagged by one quarter. crisis is a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 in the 
financial crisis (2008Q1-2011Q3) and zero otherwise. 
 
 
